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Politics of Taxonomy in Postcolonial Indonesia:  
Ethnic Traditions between Religionisation  
and Secularisation 
Martin Ramstedt ∗ 
Abstract: »Politik der Taxonomie im postkolonialen Indonesien: Ethnische Tra-
ditionen zwischen Religionisierung und Säkularisierung«. The article discusses 
the politics of taxonomy that drive the entangled dynamics of religionisation 
and secularisation of ethnic traditions in postcolonial Indonesia, and the asso-
ciated sociopolitical context. Defined in accordance with both emic notions of 
agamasasi (religionisation) and the concept of religion-making originally ad-
vanced by Arvind-Pal S. Mandair and Markus Dressler in 2011, “religionisation” 
relates to three interrelated processes that have had distinct ramifications in 
the different periods of postcolonial Indonesian history: (1) the way in which 
the Indonesian state has reified and institutionalised ‘religion’ as a monotheis-
tic, revealed, and scriptural world religion; (2) the state-sanctioned positioning 
of ‘religion’ as distinct from local forms of spiritual belief, resulting in the de-
sacralisation and secularisation of the latter; and (3) the way in which adher-
ents of ethnic spiritualities have reframed and transformed their respective 
traditions in order to reflect the state-defined notion of ‘religion,’ and, in doing 
so, also accepted and strengthened the state discourse of development and 
modernity. The article also supports Nils Bubandt’s observation that the bound-
aries between the secular and the spiritual have always remained porous in In-
donesian society as even so-called secular Indonesian politicians have tended to 
fall back on locally flavoured mystical or magical beliefs and practices in order 
to secure their political power. 
Keywords: Religionisation, secularisation, ethnic religions, Indonesia, Islamisa-
tion. 
1. Introduction 
In the 2010 Indonesian census, 207,176,162 Indonesians of the country’s total 
population of 237,641,326 identified themselves as Muslim (87.18%); 
16,528,513 people identified themselves as Protestant (6.95%); 6,907,873 as 
Catholic (2.91%); 4,012,116 as Hindu (1.69%); 1,703,254 as Buddhist 
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(0.72%), and 117,091 as Confucian (0.05%). Apart from the adherents of those 
religions specifically named by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs 
(MoRA) as religions adhered to by the Indonesian people, namely Islam, Prot-
estantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, 299,617 
Indonesians (0.17%) identified themselves as members of other religious tradi-
tions. The census also counted 139,582 people (0.06%) who did not state their 
religion and a further 757,118 (0.32%) who had not been asked (Sensus 
Penduduk 2010).  
Over 99% of the Indonesian population thus formally adhere to a world reli-
gion. This high percentage of formal believers tallies with the fact that the first 
of the five foundational principles of the Indonesian state, contained in the 
preamble to the Indonesian constitution, is “belief in the One and Only God” 
(HPPURI 1992, 1). This principle is reaffirmed in Article 29 of the constitu-
tion, which was the only article explicitly dedicated to the issue of ‘religion’ 
before the adoption of a catalogue of human rights during the constitutional 
reform between 1999 and 2002 (Butt and Lindsey 2012, 20-23, 224-34). Arti-
cle 29 (1) stipulates that “the state is based on belief in the One and Only God.” 
Article 29 (2) further states that “the state grants every citizen the freedom to 
embrace their respective religion, and to worship God in accordance with their 
religion and their belief.” As such, the state does not grant freedom from reli-
gion. The human rights catalogue, added in 2000, does mention “religious 
freedom” under Article 28 (E), Article 28 (I), and Article 28 (J), but only as 
defined in Article 29 (UUDRI Amendmen 2002, 12-5). 
The authors of the original Indonesian constitution from 1945 actually al-
lowed for a definition of “belief in the One and Only God” that would encom-
pass all the ethnic spiritual traditions and world religions extant in the archipel-
ago that profess belief in a supreme deity (see also Boland 1971, 17-39). In the 
course of the following decades, however, the right to worship God in accord-
ance with one’s religion and belief was increasingly circumscribed by legisla-
tion which de facto reduced the meaning of “belief in the One and Only God” 
to the notion of dīn. The Arabic term dīn connotes justice or law, conduct based 
on local custom, belief in and worship of God (Gardet 2012). MoRA did not 
establish dīn as a generic term for all religions it recognised, though. It took 
recourse, instead, in the term agama, which had been used as a term for reli-
gion since the 19th century. Agama derives from Sanskrit āgama, i.e., “reli-
gious or traditional doctrine,” and entered modern Indonesian via Old Javanese, 
āgama (Zoetmulder 1982, 23), and modern Javanese, agami/agama 
(Prawiroatmodjo 1996, 3). In Javanese, agama/agami acquired a new connota-
tion, namely that of “book of law.” Accordingly, all religions officially recog-
nised by MoRA as agama are marked by a universal, monotheistic theology, 
based on divine revelation to a holy prophet, and are contained in a holy book 
(Atkinson 1983, 174-8; Ramstedt 2004a, 9; Picard and Madinier 2011, xi, 3-4). 
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MoRA has thus been instrumental in the reification and institutionalisation of 
‘religion’ as monotheistic, revealed, and scriptural world religion. 
Until the end of the 1950s, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism were the 
only recognised religions (Boland 1971; 37, 106). Hinduism (Ramstedt 2018, 
268), Buddhism (Brown 1987, 108-15), and Confucianism (Lasiyo 1992, 54-
55) attained the status of agama only during the 1960s after their adherents 
redesigned their ‘theologies’ and religious practices accordingly (Ramstedt 
2004b, 211-6; Schiller 1996, 414-5). Indonesia’s many ethnic spiritual tradi-
tions were excluded from the concept of agama, even when displaying traces 
of Islamic, Christian, or ancient Hindu-Buddhist influence. This is because they 
were invariably characterised by what both Muslim and Christian authorities 
since the colonial period have regarded as “animism” and “ancestor worship”. 
While Dutch colonial scholarship categorised all ethnic traditions under the 
generic term adat, Arabic for “custom” (Paulus 1917, 6), MoRA referred to 
their spiritual dimensions – in contradistinction to agama – as “currents of 
belief” (aliran kepercayaan). Positioning ‘religion’ as distinct from local forms 
of spiritual belief, MoRA was hence also instrumental in the desacralisation 
and concomitant secularisation of the latter. 
On the basis of the principle of “belief in the One and Only God,” the Indo-
nesian state declared in 1952 adherents of aliran kepercayaan targets of reli-
gious proselytising. Until the 1960s, this meant that adherents of ethnic reli-
gions were urged to convert to either Christianity or Islam. In order to prevent 
unwelcome missionary activity in their regions, the spiritual leaders of ethnic 
traditions such as Karo Pemena in North Sumatra (Kipp Smith 1993, 232-6), 
Ngaju and Luangan Kaharingan in Central Kalimantan (Schiller 1996, 413), 
Bugis To Wani To Lotang in South Sulawesi (Ramstedt 2004b, 201-05), 
Tengger Buda in East Java (Hefner 1985, 6-8, 246), Sasak Wetu Telu in Lom-
bok (Cederroth 1996, 30), and so forth, sought to ‘religionise’ their ethnic 
traditions by reformulating their tenets and modes of worship according to the 
blueprint of state-defined agama. Despite such religionisation efforts, MoRA 
invariably refused to recognise ethnic traditions as agama – with the exception 
of the Balinese tradition.  
The Indonesian state recognised Balinese beliefs and practices as local vari-
ants of Hinduism, above all because colonial orientalist scholarship had cast 
Balinese culture as part of “Greater India,” a world civilisation.1 Additionally, 
Balinese leaders had successfully reframed the highly syncretistic beliefs and 
practices of their local tradition along the lines of modern Indian monotheistic 
                                                             
1  For more detail on how orientalist scholarship cast Balinese culture as part of Greater India, 
see Boon 1977, 1-6, 10-30; Ramstedt 2011, 525-9; Bloembergen and Eickhoff 2011, 405-7, 
410-5, 429-31. 
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neo-Hinduism. Thus transformed, MoRA was able to recognise Balinese ‘Hin-
duism’ as agama.2 
Leaders of Pemena (Kipp Smith 1993, 243-52; Ginting 2004, 236-41), 
Kaharingan (Schiller 1996, 413-4; Weinstock 1984, 12, 190-4), To Wani To 
Lotang, Sa’dan-Toraja Aluk To Dolo, and Mamasa-Toraja Ada’ Mappurondo in 
South Sulwesi (Ramstedt 2004b, 206-17) as well as Buda (Hefner 1985, 72, 
142-62, 182-97, 207-59) tried to emulate the Balinese Hindu movement by 
declaring their ethnic traditions to be local Hindu variants, thereby trying a 
different strategy of religionisation. While their efforts eventually proved suc-
cessful, a substantial number of the communities still converted to Islam and 
Christianity. They did so because of the extensive pressure exerted by Muslim 
and Christian missionaries, because of the promise of modernity both Islam and 
Christianity were offering, and because of the fact that the Balinese Hindu 
priests, who were sent into the respective areas to teach modern Hinduism to 
the locals, tended to propagate Balinese concepts and rituals as standard Hindu-
ism rather than help translate the respective local traditions into a Hindu 
framework as the Balinese had done with their own tradition (Hefner 1985, 63, 
249; Kipp Smith 1993, 221-54; Schiller 1997, 23 and 109; Ramstedt 2004b, 
187-99 and 208-17). Many of the new Hindu converts later reconverted to 
Islam and Christianity for the same reasons (Hefner 1985, 246-7; Kipp Smith 
1993, 252; Vignato 2000, 266-356; Ginting 2004, 226-41). The majority of the 
Sasak Boda in Lombok, for their part, did not opt for Hinduism but registered 
as Buddhists after Buddhism had undergone a reframing similar to that of 
‘Hinduism,’ in order to mesh with the state concept of agama (Cederroth, 
1996, 20-1; Ramstedt 2018, 271).  
Indonesians have referred to all the aforementioned ramifications of the 
state policy of agama as “agamasasi,” literally meaning “religionisation.” Sven 
Cederroth was the first to mention this term, albeit only in the sense of aligning 
oneself with one of the world religions recognised by the Indonesian govern-
ment as had been the case with both the Sasak Boda and the Sasak Wetu Telu 
in Lombok, where Cederroth conducted fieldwork (Cederroth 1996, 20-4). 
Indonesian ideas regarding agamasasi in fact mesh with the concept of “reli-
gion-making” advanced by Arvind-Pal S. Mandair and Markus Dressler in 
2011. They define “religion-making” as a non-essentialist heuristic concept 
referring to the  
reification and institutionalization of certain ideas, social formations, and 
practices as ‘religious’ in the conventional Western meaning of the term, 
thereby subordinating them to a particular knowledge regime of religion and 
                                                             
2  For more detail on the reframing of Balinese traditional beliefs and practices within the new 
framework of Indian neo-Hinduism, see Geertz 1972, 62-84; Geertz 1993, 170-89; Ramstedt 
2002, 151-6; Picard 2004, 56-8 and 68; Picard 2011, 118 and 124-7. 
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its political, cultural, philosophical, and historical interventions. (Mandair and 
Dressler 2011, 3, 21) 
In the following, I use the term agamasasi, or religionisation, as equivalent to 
Mandair and Dressler’s concept of religion-making.  
In 1993, Rita Kipp Smith pointed to the consequence of such religionisation, 
namely the classificatory secularisation and concomitant desacralisation of 
those (parts of) ethnic traditions that defy agamasasi. After conversion, many 
converts continued to participate in traditional rituals, even if the latter in-
volved spiritual contact with ancestors through trance mediums, or the prepara-
tion of daily offerings for the ancestors, and the like. Those who had converted 
due to inner conviction no longer considered such activities as something spir-
itual or religious, but as customary (adat) or cultural (budaya) practices (Kipp 
Smith 1993, 254-61; Picard 2011, 3). The state allowed such converts to en-
gage in their customary or cultural practices for the benefit of cultural tourism, 
but only if they did so without a traditionalist attitude, that is, without an ear-
nest belief in the spiritual cosmologies undergirding the respective rituals 
(Ramstedt 2005, 212; Ramstedt, Slama, and Warta 2012, 7-11).  
Robert W. Hefner similarly uses “secularisation” when referring to the de-
sacralisation of key tenets and practices of syncretistic Javanese Muslims by 
Muslim reformers, which was triggered by the latter’s narrow concept of reli-
gion. Hefner’s understanding of secularisation thus refers to an internal process 
of secularisation within Indonesian Islam, which can also be seen as a taxo-
nomic and factual eradication of those elements not in line with Muslim ortho-
doxy (Hefner 1998, 156-9).  
With respect to the secularisation of ethnic traditions in Indonesia, Nils Bu-
bandt rightly argues that the boundary between secularity and the spiritual 
(often referred to as kebatinan, or ilmu gaib) has remained rather porous. Hav-
ing a recognised classificatory place neither in the secular discourse, nor in the 
field of ‘religion,’ the spiritual tends to remain hidden, unless it erupts sudden-
ly, for example in individual quests for power. Indonesian politicians even 
today frequently make use of local notions and practices of magic in order to 
gain a larger following (Bubandt 2012, pos. 4954-5448). Unpacking the poli-
tics of taxonomy that drive the entangled processes of religionisation and secu-
larisation of ethnic traditions in postcolonial Indonesia therefore necessitates a 
simultaneous elucidation of the sociopolitical contexts in which these politics 
have been embedded. 
2. Politics of Taxonomy under Sukarno 
The cornerstone of agamasasi and its attendant secularisation was the Decree 
by the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 9/1952/Article VI, which classified all 
ethnic traditions in Indonesia as mere “currents of belief” (aliran kepercayaan). 
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This was a reference to ancestral ways of life (adat), backwardness, and super-
stition, whereas true ‘religion’ (agama) was associated with modernity and 
seen as compatible with science and technology (Kartapradja 1990, 1-2, 205). 
The decree was intended to redress the omission of the so-called “Jakarta 
Charter” from the 1945 constitution and the wording of Articles 29, 9 and 18 of 
that constitution. The Investigative Body for Preparatory Efforts for Independ-
ence was established by the Japanese military government of occupied Indone-
sia shortly before Japan’s capitulation (Benda 1983, 194). The majority of the 
delegates endorsed the vision of a pluralist secular code of law despite heated 
debates on the issue of an Islamic state as envisioned by the proponents of 
political Islam. However, due to the principle of unanimity governing the dele-
gates’ decision-making, some recognition of the special status of Islam eventu-
ally had to be made. In a speech before the plenary, Sukarno proposed five 
foundational principles for independent Indonesia: nationalism, humanity, 
democracy, social justice, and belief in God. The last was meant to affirm the 
beliefs of Muslims, Christians, and adherents of those ethnic religions venerat-
ing an absolute Godhead. The majority of representatives accepted Sukarno’s 
proposal enthusiastically. The proponents of an Islamic state, realising that 
their full aspirations could not be fulfilled, continued to call for Islam to play a 
large role in the Indonesian constitution. In the end, a sub-committee of nine 
representatives, tasked with the actual drafting of the constitution, reached a 
gentlemen’s agreement that came to be known as the Jakarta Charter. It con-
sisted of the following addition to “belief in God”: “with the obligation for 
Muslims to observe the shari’a.” When the constitution was finally read out on 
18 August 1945, “belief in God” had been reformulated as “belief in the One 
and Only God.” It had, moreover, become the first – and thus most foundation-
al – principle of the Indonesian state. The Jakarta Charter, however, had been 
mysteriously omitted (Azis 1955, 247-58; Boland 1971, 25-38, 243-4). 
For proponents of political Islam, Article 29 of the 1945 constitution lacked 
the necessary criteria to render “belief in the One and Only God” fully congru-
ent with Islamic notions of religion. Article 9 was also a matter of concern 
because it left open the issue of the religious affiliation of Indonesia’s president 
and vice-president, allowing for the appointment of either a religious or a secu-
lar candidate (HPPURI 1992, 2). Article 18, which called for the integration of 
still-functioning adat law systems into Indonesia’s national legislation, jarred 
not only with Islamic sensitivities, but also with the anti-traditionalist stance of 
the modernists within the Indonesian independence movement (HPPURI 1992, 
2). Although Article 32 called upon the government to provide for the devel-
opment of a national Indonesian culture (budaya Indonesia), the elucidation of 
the article cautiously described this future national culture as an amalgamation 
of the best parts of Indonesia’s local traditions and “those new ingredients of 
foreign cultures that can develop and enrich the culture of one’s own nation” 
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(HPPURI 1992, 4; PTUUD 1945, Bab XIII: Pendidikan). Thus, Article 32 also 
strengthened the ethnic traditions to a certain extent. 
The contradictory notions apparent in these articles reflect the different po-
litical ideologies of the 60 delegates to the Investigative Body for Preparatory 
Efforts for Independence. While some delegates advocated Islamic theocracy, 
others supported secular nationalism. Where some envisaged a federalist state, 
others called for a unitary nation state. The Japanese appointed the conservative 
intellectual Dr. Radjiman as chair of the larger Investigative Body. The Dutch-
educated jurist Dr. Raden Soepomo became chair of the actual drafting sub-
committee. During the late Dutch colonial period, both men had been major 
proponents of the Javanist organisation Boedi Oetomo (Boland 1971, 16). 
“Javanism” (kejawen) is an emic umbrella term which was first noted as 
such by the Dutch missionary S.E. Harthoorn (1831-1883). He distinguished 
between two categories of Javanists: The first category was self-identifying 
Muslims who actually adhered to a syncretistic blend of “animist,” Hindu-
Buddhist, and Sufī beliefs and practices. This blend was locally known as “the 
Javanese Religion” (Agami Jawi). The Australian Indonesianist Merle Calvin 
Ricklefs referred to it as “the mystic synthesis.” The second category was 
groups who embraced similarly syncretistic blends, but who firmly rejected 
Islam. Instead, they oriented themselves towards Java’s glorious Hindu-
Buddhist past, particularly the period of the East Javanese Hindu-Buddhist 
Empire of Majapahit (Schuurman 1933, 4; Ricklefs 2007, 1-11, 31-46; Hefner 
2000, 15), which had existed from the 13th to the beginning of the 16th century 
CE. 
Boedi Oetomo was founded in 1908 as a scholarship fund for Javanese boys 
and girls. From the outset, the organisation was dominated by culturally and 
politically conservative members of Java’s royal houses (Sewaja 1909; Naga-
zumi 1967; Hadisutjipto 2009, 24-67). Eventually, Boedi Oetomo turned to 
politics, promoting cooperation with the Dutch and the continued importance 
of the traditional elite. While some members would have liked Islam to be 
inscribed in Boedi Oetomo’s statutes, its leaders were strongly opposed to this 
idea. In 1917, Radjiman defended this anti-Islamic stance, openly chiding 
Islam for having caused the downfall of Majapahit and thus the dilution of 
Java’s cultural refinement. He then argued that freedom of religion, rather than 
an exclusive commitment to Islam, was a fitting principle for Boedi Oetomo 
(Ricklefs 2007, 217-8; Wedyadiningrat 1952).  
In 1945, supporters of political Islam felt threatened by the influence of 
Radjiman and Soepomo, who were both known for their reservations about 
Islam. The foundation of MoRA on the basis of Government Decree No. 
5/1946 was a step towards reconciliation. MoRA was the successor institution 
to the Office for Religious Affairs (Shumubu), which was established by the 
Japanese military administration in 1942 (Benda 1983, 111-9, 132-5). Dr. Haji 
Mohamad Rasjidi, an as-yet-rather-unknown alumnus of the Al-Azhar Univer-
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sity in Cairo who was inspired by the Middle Eastern Muslim reformers al-
Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid Rida, was appointed head of MoRA. 
During his term, the Islamic law courts, which had hitherto been part of the 
secular Ministry of Justice, were put under the auspices of MoRA (Rasjidi 
1967, 92; Azra 1998, 5-14). This can arguably be viewed as a successful re-
religionisation of the Islamic law courts. 
The Ministry of Public Education (later called Ministry of Education and 
Culture), on the other hand, was put in the hands of secular nationalists, most 
of them members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which had been 
founded by Sukarno in 1927. The PNI promoted a national identity devoid of 
ethnic and religious ties, which spoke particularly to members of minority 
groups, such as Christians, Balinese, or Javanists (SKPDK 2015). Soon after 
the international recognition of the fully independent unitary Indonesian nation 
state in 1950, Emergency Law No. 1/1951 on Preliminary Steps toward the 
Unification of the Organisation, Authority and Portfolio of the Civil Courts 
dismantled local adat law institutions. The Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960, 
pushed for by the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, 
PKI) and the Indonesian Peasants’ Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), fol-
lowed this with large-scale reallocation of land from large private owners to 
“the tillers,” i.e., the small peasants and landless agricultural labourers who had 
hitherto cultivated the fields of the large landowners. The law’s protracted and 
uneven implementation frequently involved unilateral disappropriation and 
further erosion of local adat law institutions as traditional village commons 
were placed under the direct authority of the state (Lev 1973, 12 and 20-31; 
Fitzpatrick 1997, 172-212; Lucas and Warren 2013, 2-8). Legal unification 
thus reinforced the secularisation of ethnic traditions and the desacralisation of 
the sacred cosmologies they were embedded in. 
By 1960, President Sukarno had come to greatly rely on the PKI in main-
taining the balance of power between the Indonesian armed forces and political 
Islam. Originally founded as the Indies Social Democratic Association by 
Dutchman H.J.F.M Sneevliet in 1914, the party changed its name to Com-
munist Association in the Indies in 1920 and renamed itself once again to In-
donesian Communist Party in 1924. PKI members consisted mainly of Java-
nese peasants who firmly rejected the hegemonic aspirations of reform Islam as 
well as the cultural conservatism of the traditional landowning elite. Their 
vision of Marx’s classless society largely tallied with that of the leftist branch 
of Sukarno’s PNI in that they envisioned Indonesia as a kind of socialist rein-
carnation of Majapahit (Mortimer 2006; Ricklefs 2007, 216-21).  
In the first decade after independence, leftist Javanist movements proliferat-
ed. Many of them eventually joined with ethnic traditions in other parts of the 
country under the emic umbrella term of “mysticism” (kebatinan) in order to 
seek recognition in accordance with the first foundational principle of the In-
donesian state. In 1955, the first All-Indonesian Congress of Mystical Move-
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ments took place in Semarang, attended by some 2,000 delegates representing 
some 100 organisations. In 1956 and 1959, a second and then a third congress 
were organised in Surakarta followed by two seminars in 1961 and 1962 (Ar-
tawijaya 2010, 237; Shadiqin, 2011, 8). 
MoRA counteracted this religionisation attempt on the part of Indonesian 
mysticism by instigating the creation of an interdepartmental Coordinative 
Body for the Surveillance of Currents of Belief (PAKEM). According to the 
Decision by the Prime Minister No. 167/PM/ 1954, PAKEM was to advise the 
government on its legislative policy concerning the protection of social peace. 
In 1959, anti-communist generals of the Indonesian armed forces established 
branches of PAKEM in several provinces where they had seized control. By 
1964, PAKEM had registered some 360 syncretistic mystical groups in Java 
alone (Yulianta 2010, 45-9; Kartapradja 1990, 75-181). 
In 1959, MoRA fortified the boundaries between agama and aliran ke-
percayaan even further by issuing a decree that qualified “belief in the One and 
Only God” as “revealed religion” (agama wahyu), a term that in the vernacular 
has been used in opposition to agama ardhi/bumi/budaya (earth-derived, man-
made, or cultural religion). Unsurprisingly, the vernacular and derogatory term 
agama ardhi, etc., refers to all aliran kepercayaan, that is, to all ethnic tradi-
tions and mystical movements (Hyung-Jun 1998, 363). In 1959, Kyai Haji 
Muhammad Wahib Wahab was at the helm of MoRA. His father had been one 
of the founders of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a platform for traditionalist ulama 
established in 1926 in opposition to Ahmad Dachlan’s reform Muslim organi-
sation Muhammadiyah, which was founded in 1912. Together with Masyumi, 
NU was part of political Islam. Today, NU is still the largest Muslim organisa-
tion in Indonesia, along with its rival, Muhammadiyah (Bruinessen 1994, 17-
23, 26-28, 61-70, 82-6). Prior to his appointment as Minister of Religious Af-
fairs, Wahib Wahab had been active in two paramilitary organisations: the NU 
youth organisation Ansor, and the Masyumi-controlled Hizbullah. Both organi-
sations strongly opposed the increasing influence of the PKI (Aziz 1998, 181-
99; Ricklefs 2012, 70-108). 
In the general election of 1955, Masyumi, the PNI, NU, and the PKI had 
proved the most successful political parties. After the installation of the new 
parliament in 1956, a Constituent Assembly (Konstituante) was appointed to 
draw up a new and final constitution of the unitary Indonesian nation state. The 
Jakarta Charter again proved a dividing issue, fanning the flames of already 
extant separatist leanings. The Darul Islam (DI) movement in West Java, Aceh, 
and South Sulawesi was only defeated in 1965, shortly before Suharto seized 
power from Sukarno. In 1959, Sukarno finally dissolved the Konstituante and 
announced the government’s return to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. 
Replacing the parliament with the National Planning Council, he inaugurated 
the autocratic governance system of Guided Democracy, which granted him 
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considerably enhanced presidential powers (Boland 1971, 54-75; Anshari 1997, 
49, 65-115). 
From 1960 onwards, landless Javanist PKI followers began to seize land 
from traditional landowners who often adhered to reform Islam. This exacer-
bated relations between Javanists and orthodox Muslims. In 1964, intelligence 
officers under the general direction of General Suharto, forged relations with 
Islamic leaders (Ricklefs 2001, 332-8; Suwandi 2000, 30-1). In the following 
year, against the backdrop of growing conservative resistance against his re-
gime, Sukarno issued what one might interpret, at least to a certain extent, as a 
conciliatory Presidential Decision. Presidential Decision No. 1/PNPS/1965 on 
the Prevention of the Abuse and/or Blasphemy of Religion effectively sealed 
the process of agamasasi Sukarno’s government had achieved so far. The 
Blasphemy Law, as the decision came to be called, interdicts the public propa-
gation or recommendation of heterodox interpretations pertaining to the teach-
ings and practices of any of the six recognised religions. Recurrent individual 
infringements incur a prison sentence of five years. Should a mystical organisa-
tion or current of belief repeatedly breach the interdiction, it is to be shut down 
by MoRA in conjunction with the Attorney General and the Minister of Home 
Affairs, or the President (PPRI No. 1/PNPS 1965, Paragraph 1-5; PAPPRI No. 
1/PNPS 1965, I.1-5; II.1). 
The Blasphemy Law was particularly directed against millenarian Javanist 
groups advocating the appearance of a “Just King” (Ratu Adil). Many had 
initially regarded Sukarno as the Ratu Adil of their time because he had freed 
Indonesia from the yoke of the Dutch (Kartodirdjo 1973, 1-11, 66-105; Dahm 
1966, 1-15, 259). By early 1965, however, Sukarno’s charisma had faded. 
When he approached the Javanese mystical healer (dukun) Abdurachim for 
counsel, the latter advised him to step down as president (Giebels 2001, 359-
60). Sukarno did not heed this advice. His Blasphemy Law, however, curbed 
all millenarian efforts to re-enchant politics while simultaneously reasserting 
religionisation as a political imperative. 
3. Religionisation and Secularisation under Suharto 
General Suharto’s anti-communist purge following the so-called communist 
coup of 30 September 1965 was strongly supported by the NU paramilitary 
organisations Ansor and Banser as well as Hindu-Balinese militias (see also 
Human Rights Watch 2017). Most scholars today accept that, within two years, 
several hundred thousand, possibly up to one million, actual and alleged com-
munists were killed (Roosa 2006, 4-5 and 24-5; Cribb 2009, 296). By 1969, 
PAKEM had shut down over a hundred Javanist groups suspected of having 
sympathised with the PKI. That year, President Suharto made Sukarno’s presi-
dential decision (the ‘Blasphemy Law’) into a law: Law No. 5/1969 (UU 
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No.5/PNPS/1969 2009). From now on, citizens were required to register their 
religious affiliation with the local authorities. Their religious affiliation also 
had to be displayed on their identity cards (Yang 2005, 3). This resulted in 
waves of mass conversion by adherents of ethnic traditions, from which all 
recognised religions profited (Bruinessen 1995, 6; Ramstedt 2004a, 15). In 
1984, PAKEM was transferred from MoRA to the (secular) Attorney General, 
which symbolically confirmed the government’s view of aliran kepercayaan as 
secular and potentially criminal organisations (Amnesty International 2014, 
16). Given that Suharto was widely appreciated as an avid practitioner of Java-
nese mystical lore at the time (Anderson 1990, 23-7; Bourchier 2010, pos. 
1599-1616; Artha 2007; Bangunwijo 2007), the criminalisation of ethnic spirit-
uality seems somewhat paradoxical. 
Until 1978, Suharto had actually protected those aliran kepercayaan, for 
which no connection to the PKI could be traced (Ricklefs 2001, 373). He did 
clamp down, though, on leftist millennarian movements as well as those oppos-
ing his regime. In 1968, a unit of the Army Strategic Reserve Command 
(KOSTRAD) killed East Javanese mystic Embah Suro, the leader of a several 
million-strong Javanist movement close to the PKI, along with 80 of his fol-
lowers (Mitchell 1968, 28-29; Kahin 2015, 247). In 1976, the Javanese mystic 
Sawito Kartowibowo composed a number of inflammatory documents which 
criticised the government on various counts and demanded that President Su-
harto resign. A court verdict of 1978 finally sentenced Sawito to eight years in 
prison (Narto 1978, 5-76 and 156-206; Bourchier 2010, passim). Thereafter, 
Suharto guarded against Javanese mysticism in general.  
Suharto also re-engineered Indonesia’s ethnic traditions as cultural resources 
of an essentially modern secular national culture. This entailed a rapid folklor-
isation and commodification of once sacred local arts and crafts for the grow-
ing tourist industry. Taman Mini Indonesia Indah on the outskirts of Jakarta 
became the epitome of this process. In the park, the sacred architecture and arts 
of ethnic groups that had become emblematic of the different regions of the 
country were put on display as objects of recreation (Foulcher 1990, 304-11; 
Ramstedt 2005, 212-5). As a footnote, Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 and 
Minister of Home Affairs Directive No. 477/74054/BA.01.2/4683/95 from 
1978 prohibited the public display of Chinese culture, including Confucianism, 
which lost its status as a recognised religion. This led most Sino-Indonesians to 
officially convert to Islam, Christianity, or Buddhism (Yang 2005, 2-3). 
By the mid-1970s, each of the five recognised religious communities had 
been forced to establish a representative council responsible to the regime. 
These bodies were the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars (MUI), the 
Alliance of (Protestant) Churches in Indonesia (PGI), the Indonesian Bishops’ 
Conference (KWI), the Indonesian Hindu Council (PHDI), and the Guardian 
Body of the Indonesian Buddhist Community (WALUBI). All of the councils 
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were closely supervised by MoRA and became members of the government 
party Golkar.3 
The first Minister of Religious Affairs under Suharto was Kyai Haji Mo-
hammad Dachlan. Dachlan and other NU leaders had signed a declaration in 
1966, expressing their full support for General Suharto’s efforts to disband the 
PKI, re-establish order, and guard against communist guerrilla politics (Much-
tar 1998, 258). In 1971, Dachlan was succeeded by Prof. Dr. A. Mukti Ali, a 
modernist Islamic intellectual affiliated with Muhammadiyah who had studied 
in Mecca, at the University of Karachi and McGill University in Montreal. 
Mukti Ali’s appointment ended the dominance of NU politicians within MoRA 
and transformed the ministry into an institution that would help Suharto disci-
pline political Islam. In 1973, Suharto forced all the different Islamic political 
parties to merge into one party, the United Development Party (PPP). He unit-
ed all other extant political parties, such as the Catholic Party, the Protestant 
Party, the PNI, and the ultra-leftist Proletarian Deliberation Party (Murba) as 
the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Neither the PPP nor the PDI were 
allowed to organise any activities below the district level, whereas Suharto’s 
own party, Golkar, was permitted to work at village level. In order to further 
prevent any rural opposition, it was decided during the Parliamentary Session 
of March 1978 that aliran kepercayaan would no longer receive any govern-
ment protection (Munhanif 1998, 272-301; Ricklefs 2001, 361-92).  
MoRA’s branch offices as well as those of the five religious councils ex-
tended to the village level. MUI’s primary tasks comprised translating govern-
ment goals into fatwas and recommendations (tausiyah), monitoring religious 
life for the government, and serving as a go-between for the government and 
Islamic scholars (Ichwan 2005, 48). The councils of the other religious com-
munities had similar assignments (Ramstedt 2018, 269-72; Subanar 2005, 175-
88). Government interests and religion were thus effectively fused and the 
influence of transnational religious movements curbed. In 1983, the govern-
ment forced all religious organisations to recognise the five foundational prin-
ciples of the Indonesian state as their sole ideological foundation (azas tung-
gal). Under Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, the first Minister of Religious 
Affairs with a military background, MoRA sought to balance the azas tunggal 
policy with enhanced internal mission activity within each of the five religious 
communities (Adnan 1990, 461-7; Abdillah 1998, 324-34). This put even more 
pressure on those who sought to maintain their ethnic beliefs and practices 
under the guise of one of the state religions. Moreover, new religious move-
ments, like ISKCON, Nichiren, or Jehovah’s Witnesses, were now classified as 
                                                             
3  For more detail on the affiliation of the different religious councils with Suharto’s Golkar 
party, see Ichwan 2005, 46-8; Hooker 1997, 16; Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008; Bagus 
2004, 86-7; Somvir 2004, 257; Ramstedt 2018, 271-4. 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  276 
aliran kepercayaan and consequentially lost their religious status (Sihombing 
2008, 31; Ramstedt 2018, 272). 
In 1989, Suharto suddenly went on a well-publicised pilgrimage to Mecca, 
tantamount to a public abandonment of Javanism. Many Muslims regarded the 
pilgrimage as a purely strategic move (Suharto 1991, 209-21; Syeikh Imam 
Ashaari Muhammad 1993). Widespread modernisation and urbanisation had 
meanwhile resulted in the emergence of a well-educated Muslim middle class 
whose members started to fill the ranks of the civil service and business and 
gain political influence. Moreover, Suharto’s fall-out with the Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces – the Catholic General Benny Murdani – over the 
business activities of Suharto’s children, necessitated a major shift in the re-
gime’s power base. Suharto’s ostentatious “turn to Mecca” laid the foundation 
for a profound legal accommodation of Islam, which completely offset his 
previous policies of separating religion from politics and granting all recog-
nised religions equal treatment (Hefner 2000, 123-7; Ricklefs 2001, 376-91). 
Law No. 2/1989 on the National Education System, for instance, obliged the 
government to provide appropriate funding for private Islamic schools, while 
the schools of the other religions saw severe cuts in funding. Law No. 7/1989 
on Religious Judicature raised the judicial authority of the Islamic courts to the 
level of the secular civil and military courts (Ramstedt 2016, 72-4), while adat 
law institutions were seriously obstructed by government interference (Moni-
aga 2007, 278-83; Arizona and Cahyadi 2013, 44). In 1990, Suharto created the 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) and placed at its helm 
his Minister of Research and Technology, the German-educated modernist 
Muslim B.J. Habibie. Thanks to Habibie, many ICMI members rapidly gained 
access to the ranks of the Indonesian civil service, which helped accelerate 
what NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid called the “reconfessionalisation of poli-
tics” (Hefner 2000, 128-66; Ramage 1995, 61-121). 
4. Political and Taxonomic Shifts in Post-New Order 
Indonesia 
After the breakdown of Suharto’s New Order regime in the wake of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, interim President Habibie initiated a far-reaching gov-
ernance reform which was implemented and revised during the legislatures of 
Adurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). By 2004, the 
intense spells of violent inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, which had 
occurred during the regime transition, had subsided (Colombijn and Lindblad 
2002, 1-7; Klinken 2002). The intensity of these conflicts had nevertheless 
driven home the fact that the reform process would have to tackle long-
standing issues, such as adat revivalism, the question of religious freedom, and 
the status of the Jakarta Charter (Henley and Davidson 2007, 1-29; Klinken 
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2008, 35-42). In 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid annulled Suharto’s Pres-
idential Instruction No. 14/1967, paving the way for the revival of Chinese 
culture, including Confucianism, among the Sino-Indonesian population (Lem-
bong 2008, 52-3; Winarta 2008, 62-5). A profound law reform as part of the 
governance reform ensured the decentralisation of important governance func-
tions. Decentralisation gave boost to old local patron-client relations and facili-
tated the emergence of new ones. Traditional ethnic and religious elites, like 
former sultans and kings, priests and religious scholars, and affluent business-
people and local bureaucrats, etc., now started to rally people around them by 
calling for the revitalization of indigenous customary law, or the strengthening 
of religious norms and institutions. This in turn facilitated the issuance of a 
wave of regional regulations juridifying both adat as well as Islamic norms in 
the different regions, despite the concurrent adoption of a whole range of new 
human rights in the Indonesian Constitution. The law reform also entailed the 
establishment of a Constitutional Court, which was to become instrumental in 
settling motions for judicial reviews with respect to indigenous rights and the 
issue of religious freedom (Lindsey 2007, 3-4 and 11-26; Lev 2007). 
In 1999, leaders of various ethnic traditions organised themselves into the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), which helped bring 
about the second constitutional amendment reconfirming and strengthening the 
authority of the judiciary institutions of those adat communities still function-
ing as such (Moniaga 2007, 275-85; Arizona and Cahyadi 2013, 44-62). Sever-
al ethnic communities were content with such factual strengthening of local 
adat law and did not further seek to challenge the taxonomic boundaries be-
tween adat and agama. The Minangkabau in West Sumatra, for example, suc-
cessfully lobbied for the juridification of their traditional village adat (nagari). 
It became local village law in 2008 (Perda Prov Sumatera Barat No. 2/2008, 
Art. 7/1:2.a.4.; Perda Prop Sumatera Barat No. 7/2018). Juridified 
Minangkabau customary village law naturally retained its decidedly secular 
status, however, as Minangkabau identity has been strongly influenced by 
Wahhabi Islam since the 19th century (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-
Beckmann 2013, 432-8; Hadler 2008, 5-9, 19-32). In predominantly Christian 
Tanah Toraja, the regional parliament similarly juridified the customary village 
governance model of the lembang without compromising the Christian dimen-
sion of mainstream Sa’dan-Toraja identity (Jong 2009, 256-7, 276-81; Perda 
Kab Tator No. 3/2015). The Balinese also fought successfully for the juridifica-
tion of the desa pakraman, a customary form of village administration. While 
adat has never been treated as secular in Bali, it has either been directly sub-
sumed under ‘Hindu law’ or at least seen as synergetic with the Hindu religion 
(Warren 2007, 172-6; Ramstedt 2009, 332-64). In the cases of the 
Minangkabau, the Sa’dan-Toraja, and the Balinese, the taxonomic boundaries 
between agama and aliran kepercayaan – now again called adat – were thus 
not at all compromised. 
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Indigenous advocacy elsewhere, however, continued to demand recognition 
of local ethnic traditions, including the sacred cosmologies they are embedded 
in. A first major victory was Constitutional Court Decision No. 35/PUU-
X/2012 on the Judicial Review of Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry, submitted by 
AMAN and two adat communities. According to the decision, forests tradi-
tionally regarded as adat land should be owned by local adat communities and 
not by the state (Decision Number 35/PUU-X/2012). In 2017, the Constitution-
al Court also decided in favour of petitioners in the Judicial Review of Law No. 
23/2006 on Population Administration, which was filed by the leaders of four 
aliran kepercayaan, the Marapu (Sumba), Parmalim (North Sumatra), Ugamo 
Bangso Batak (Medan, North Sumatra), and Sapto Darmo (Java). The court 
found that the stipulation in Law No. 23/2006 that an as-yet-unrecognised faith 
cannot be written in the religion column of citizens’ identity cards contradicts 
the Indonesian Constitution. The Constitutional Court recommended that, 
alongside the recognised religions, the government create a separate category 
for “adherents of a belief” (penghayat kepercayaan), which would allow for a 
respective entry on identity cards (Putusan No. 97/PUU-XIV/2016; Sheany 
2017). In the eyes of many Indonesians, this amounted to a re-religionisation of 
ethnic traditions. 
The decision was well received by Aluk To Dolo and Kaharingan leaders. 
The priest Minaa Kembong Lisulembang, for instance, stated in the local media 
that the decision would finally allow the adherents of Aluk To Dolo to leave the 
Hindu community and establish their own faith community (Arthur 2017). In 
2012, AMAN had supported a demonstration of several hundreds of adherents 
of Hindu Kaharingan in South Kalimantan, demanding the recognition of their 
ethnic religion as a separate agama (Pitakasari 2012; Dom 2017). The Catholic 
Manggarai in West Flores, on the other hand, revived their traditional religious 
practices without leaving the Catholic faith (Henley and Davidson 2007, 15; 
Erb 2007, 247-8 and 257-62). 
In contrast to the PHDI and the KWI, MUI continued to advocate external 
agamasasi and reinforce internal agamasasi, rigorously suppressing any ac-
commodation of syncretism within the boundaries of Islam. By 2000, MUI had 
succeeded in dissociating itself from its negative image as a mere appendix of 
Suharto’s regime, reinventing itself as the force that would realise Muslim 
aspirations in post-New Order Indonesia (Ichwan 2005, 50-3). Council mem-
bers were eventually no longer exclusively recruited from among the two es-
tablished Muslim organisations Muhammadiyah and NU, but also from more 
radical organisations, such as the Forum Pembela Islam (FPI), or the Hizb ut-
Tahrir Indonesia (Bruinessen 2013, 3). MUI even started to engage in the 
political arena, thereby seeking to religionise that secular field (Wilson 2008, 3; 
Ichwan 2013, 61-4 and 70-90). In the “Advice by the MUI Executive Leading 
Up to the 1999 Election,” it exhorted Indonesian Muslims, inter alia, to “priori-
tize Islamic brotherhood and to abstain from involvement in conflict and fric-
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tion.” Moreover, “the entire nation, especially the Umma, should be cautious of 
the latent danger of communism and the PKI” (Ichwan 2005, 56). In its “In-
struction to the Umma Leading Up to the Election of 7 June 1999” MUI re-
peated its exhortation to strengthen Muslim unity (Ichwan 2005, 56-7), which 
was clearly directed against the popular candidate for the presidency Megawati 
Sukarnoputri and her essentially secular Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle 
(PDI-P). In addition to taking issue with the secular nature of the PDI-P, MUI 
also opposed Megawati’s candidature because she was a woman, which dis-
qualified her in the eyes of conservative Muslims, and because she was known 
to have consulted the famous Javanese mystic Permadi.  
Eventually, it was Abdurrahman Wahid, head of the NU, who was elected 
President with the support of a coalition of Islamic parties under the leadership 
of M. Amien Rais (Thompson 1999, 4; Ricklefs 2001, 418-21). Megawati, for 
her part, was appointed vice-president. Due to Wahid’s affirmation of pluralism 
and the essentially secular drive of his policies, the Islamic parties soon became 
disillusioned with his presidency. MUI even developed into one of Wahid’s 
major opponents (Ichwan 2005, 61-2 and 70-2). In 2001, the parliament im-
peached and removed Wahid from presidency over accusations of corruption 
and abuse of power. His successor was Megawati, who remained in office for 
the remainder of the original term of his legislature, i.e., until 2004. 
Efforts by Muslim activists to get the Jakarta Charter reinserted into the In-
donesian Constitution were thwarted in the 2001 and 2002 sessions of the Peo-
ple’s Consultative Assembly. Although the Jakarta Charter was not included in 
the fourth and final amendment of the Indonesian Constitution, the decentrali-
sation process facilitated the issuance of a number of regional regulations ac-
commodating shari’a norms in those districts in which conservative Muslims 
were strong (Bush 2008, 176-86; Bruinessen 2013, 2). The latter gained further 
victories when during the legislature of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Law No. 
3/2006 on Religious Justice was issued and the Constitutional Court confirmed 
Sukarno’s Blasphemy Law in 2010. Law No. 3/2006 broadened and strength-
ened the jurisdiction of the Islamic courts by granting them jurisdiction over 
disputes involving Islamic economic transactions, and by obliging litigants 
officially registered as Muslims to thereafter bring disputes in matters under 
Islamic jurisdiction to Islamic courts only. This amounted to an oblique institu-
tionalisation of the Jakarta Charter, and thus to an additional strengthening of 
MUI’s enhanced religionisation efforts with respect to Islam (Lindsey 2008, 
41; Ramstedt 2016, 95-6). The confirmation of the Blasphemy Law equally 
ensured that Indonesian Muslims remain under the sway of orthodoxy. 
MUI also issued a number of fatwas intended to keep Islam unadulterated 
by heretic (sesat) concepts and practices stemming from Javanism, Ahmadiyya, 
and Shi’a, or new religious movements that had emerged throughout Indonesia 
(Makin 2016; 4-11), such as the fatwa against traditional healers (dukun) and 
prophecy (2005); the fatwa against interreligious worship (2005); the fatwa 
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against both Ahmadiyya Qadiyan and Ahmadiya Lohore (2005); the fatwa on 
the strengthening of the Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah (2006); the fatwa specifying 
the characteristics of a divergent belief, called aliran sesat (2007); the fatwa 
against yoga (2009); and the fatwa declaring the Shi’a as an aliran sesat (2012) 
(HFMUI 2011). 
Whereas MUI’s fatwas are not legally binding, more than 120 people be-
longing to various religious minority groups were convicted of insulting Islam, 
or blasphemy, between 1998 and 2009 alone. This provoked growing concern 
about the potential misuse of the blasphemy law, particularly in view of the 
absence of a clear distinction between heresy and blasphemy in its wording. In 
2009, a coalition of NGOs, coordinated by the Indonesian Legal Aid Founda-
tion, applied in vain to the Constitutional Court for a judicial review (Crouch 
2012a; Crouch 2012b). 
In 2017, however, the Constitutional Court rehabilitated all registered aliran 
kepercayaan because they, like the recognised religions, should be entitled to 
constitutional protection. MoRA promptly issued a statement that it would 
support the decision by the Constitutional Court and regard it as final and bind-
ing. It nevertheless stressed that agama and aliran kepercayaan should not be 
equated (Cahyadi 2017). MUI reacted in a similar vein, proposing to the gov-
ernment that the identity cards of adherents of aliran kepercayaan should 
merely state “belief,” with the religion column left blank (Chairunnisa 2017; 
Wulandari 2018). 
5. Conclusion 
My description of the politics of taxonomy in postcolonial Indonesia, and the 
sociopolitical dynamics that informed them, has shown how the entangled 
processes of religionisation and secularisation resulting from these politics 
played out differently in the various phases of the history of postcolonial Indo-
nesia. I defined “religionisation” in accordance with both emic notions of aga-
masasi and the concept of religion-making, originally advanced by Mandair 
and Dressler. The concept of religionisation thus first of all highlighted the way 
in which the Indonesian state reified and institutionalised ‘religion’ as a mono-
theistic, revealed, and scriptural world religion, between 1945 and 1965. Sec-
ondly, religionisation emphasised the state-sanctioned positioning of agama as 
distinct from local forms of spiritual belief that were categorised under the 
umbrella term of aliran kepercayaan (ethnic spirituality, and later also new 
religious movements). Aliran kepercayaan were – as Kipp Smith and Hefner 
pointed out – desacralised and secularised in the process, which lasted until the 
end of the Suharto period. Thirdly, religionisation brought into focus how 
adherents of ethnic spiritualities reframed and transformed their respective 
traditions in accordance with state-defined agama, irrespective of whether they 
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did so with the intention of getting the traditions acknowledged as religions in 
their own right, or in order to safeguard them within the guise of a certain state-
recognised religion. Such reframing was particularly characteristic of the years 
between 1965 and 1980, during which increasingly pervasive sensibilities vis-
à-vis the importance of ‘development’ and ‘progress’ resulted in the conver-
gence of the discourse of religionisation with the discourse of modernity. In 
post-New Order Indonesia, the revitalisation of adat has again on occasion, like 
in the case of Kaharingan, facilitated the casting of ethnic traditions in accord-
ance with the state-defined guidelines for agama. 
The era after the fall of Suharto saw a profound law and governance reform 
that brought about far-reaching democratisation and civic participation, and 
with it the re-emergence of ideological contradictions inherent in the sociopo-
litical make-up of postcolonial Indonesia right from the start. While human 
rights and indigenous rights activists have been calling for the legal protection 
of convictions and beliefs as yet not recognised as religion, conservative Mus-
lims have successfully defended – often with recourse to the Blasphemy Law – 
classical religionisation in the face of such challenges, if not within Indonesian 
society as a whole, then at least within the Muslim community. Interestingly, 
neither the continuous desacralisation of heterodox spiritualities by conserva-
tive Islam nor the new emancipation of ethnic traditions by the Constitutional 
Court has strengthened the discourse of secularity in Indonesia. Religious and 
often respiritualised ethnic identities continue to function as moral compasses 
for the majority of Indonesians. This has also become apparent, as Bubandt 
rightfully remarked, in the frequent recourse to magic and mysticism (klenik, 
ilmu gaib) by actors in the so-called secular field of power politics in Indonesia 
up to today. 
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